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Diagnostic interaction: 
First-person patient narratives on Hacking's looping effects  




 What is the interaction between a psychiatric patient and their diagnosis? How do they respond 
to being classified? A number of philosophical theories attempt to explain the interaction between the 
diagnosed patient and their classification. Ian Hacking develops an account of interaction which holds 
that objects of human science classification are influenced by the awareness of the classification in a 
way that changes both the classification and its object. Hacking thinks that psychiatric patients are 
“interactive kinds” whose awareness of their classification causes changes in the individuals' 
experience of themselves, and thus changes in their classification. Hacking claims that these “looping 
effects” destabilize the classifications and their objects, and make them “moving targets.” But Jonathan 
Tsou responds to Hacking with the claim that many objects are less subject to looping effects than 
Hacking thinks. Tsou attributes this stability to most classifications' grounding in biological ubiquities.  
 Theories of interaction must account for the lived experience of these objects of classification.  
The narratives of psychiatric patients provide opportunities to test Hacking's and Tsou's versions of 
looping effects theory. These written first-person narratives were found in public sources on the 
internet. A broad review of psychiatric patient writing revealed that most patient narratives fell into one 
of two categories, “true believers” or “skeptics,” distinguished by the patients' perceived beliefs about 
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the legitimacy of their diagnosis.  
 The “true believer” phenomenon is represented in the narrative of Woodrow Odom Lucas, age 
36, whose diagnosis is schizoaffective disorder. Lucas' writing was found on the New York Times 
“Patient Voices” blog (“Patient Voices: Schizophrenia”):  
 “The first time I began having symptoms of schizoaffective disorder was in 1999. 
I started to hear strange voices, not just comforting or guiding internal intuitions, but 
voices telling me that I was the spawn of Satan, or voices telling me that I was about to 
come under judgment...I really began to believe those voices. I experienced acute 
psychosis, which I thought at the time was a demon inside of my trying to take over my 
mind. Schizoaffective disorder is like a cross between bipolar and schizophrenia. The 
psychosis side and the delusion side is much less severe than schizophrenia but more 
severe than bipolar II. The mood swings in my opinion may be a little less severe than 
certain dimensions of bipolar so it's like worse than bipolar, better than schizophrenia, 
and a mixture of the two. 
 In the beginning, it was horrific. I had a lot of ambition...all of this was shattered. 
My efficacy as a father was virtually gone. I felt like I had no love for my wife or anyone 
in the beginning months. I was extremely depressed, morose and disconnected. I think 
I've got a long way to go, but throughout it, because of the love of God and people, it's 
been a journey of hope.” 
 
The orientation of the skeptic is demonstrated in Leah Harris' writing. Harris, writing as an adult, was a 
teenage mental health patient. Her writing was found on the “Beyond Meds – Alternatives to 
Psychiatry” blog (“Decolonizing our minds, freeing our spirits: Guest blogger Leah Harris”): 
 “I had just been released from yet another hospital for a half-hearted suicide 
attempt... I had alternately fought and reluctantly accepted a view of myself as “sick” and 
“disordered.” I hated the labels but identified with them at the same time...I had no tools, 
no frameworks, with which to redraw the maps in my mind... But slowly, I discovered 
that I could work with voices...I have gotten feedback from many people that when they 
got a psychiatric label, it was a relief because it gave a name to what they had been 
experiencing. I don’t discount the importance of a framework to make sense of our 
experiences, but who wants to be defined by a so-called illness? 
 I have found great validation...not from any psychiatric label but from friends in and 
out of the “mad movement.” We see how various institutions and oppressions are 
connected...It matters not if we are “well” or “ill,” “normal,” or “disordered.” I see our 
movement as... stealing back truths from industries that would have us only consume 
what they produce, whether it’s ways of viewing ourselves or specific “treatments.” They 
would have us believe that we are so “sick” that we don’t know what’s in our own best 
interest, and we resist that determination with all our might. We are teaching each other 




 Patient narratives reveal a phenomenon which Hacking's looping effects theory does not 
account for, and which Jonathan Tsou cites in his response. Narratives show that patients who are true 
believers or skeptics are less “on the move” than Hacking thinks. True believers identify so thoroughly 
with their diagnosis that they “buy in” to its explanation for their experience, loop in the direction of 
their diagnosis, and stabilize. Skeptics reject diagnosis and psychiatric nosology in general and refuse 
to interact with their classifications; their rejection makes themselves outliers, not subject to looping 
effects and stabilized outside nosology. The narratives of both of these groups provide evidence to 
support Tsou's claim that Hacking is wrong about the extreme destabilization of psychiatric patients 
and their diagnosis. But they also call attention to something which neither Hacking nor Tsou account 
for: that patients' perception of the scientific and normative status of psychiatric nosology is a variable 
that affects the way they interact with and respond to diagnosis.  
 By normative, I mean that nosology is shaped by human judgment about what is good, healthy 
or “normal species functioning,” and that the categories are conjectural, designed for human use, and 
may not reflect deeper truths or “nature carved at its joints.” The normative status of human science 
nosology is widely accepted by the scientific community, but little work has examined patients' 
interaction with normativity.  
 The claim that patients' acceptance or rejection of the scientific legitimacy of psychiatric 
classification may affect their response to diagnosis is the novel contribution of this paper to the 
discussion about patient interaction. The essential distinction between “true believers” and “skeptics” is 
their beliefs about the normative status of psychiatry. It is the rigidity of their beliefs in either direction 
that explains how they become stable objects amidst Hacking's moving targets.  
 This paper begins by defining how all scientific classification schemes are inherently normative. 
A brief review of the evolution of the concept of mental illness, the psychiatric institution, and the 
formulation of current psychiatric nosology developed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
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Mental Disorders shows the normative terrain of nosology, and suggests some aspects of normativity 
that may be problematic. Next, the paper will discuss the “DSM culture” created by the DSM's 
monopoly over the mental health system, which legitimizes existing nosology while construing the 
constructed-ness of the classifications themselves. Its medical explanation is framed as the powerful, 
ubiquitous “master narrative,” which further construes the normative status of the nosology it 
represents. Next, the paper will offer a detailed account of Hacking's and Tsou's theories on looping 
effects. Then, it will analyze the patient narratives to show how they support Tsou's claim that Hacking 
is mistaken about the unstable status of objects of human science classification. Finally, it will claim 
that what we can infer about awareness of the master narrative in the skeptics' and true believers' 
writing suggests that patients' ideas about the normative status of scientific nosology may affect the 
way they respond to classification. I submit that patients' beliefs about the normative status of scientific 
classification schemes, and psychiatric nosology specifically, influence the way patients interact with 
diagnosis.  
 
I. The normative status of human science nosology  
 It is widely accepted in the scientific, medical and philosophical community that scientific 
classification schemes have normative status. By normative, I mean that classification schemes are 
designed with reference to an ideal of good health or “normal species functioning” (Silvers, 64). 
Normative statements make claims about what is good or bad, or how the world ought to be.  
 All disease classification schemes are inherently normative because judgment goes into 
establishing what we consider to good, normal or healthy, and what we, conversely, consider 
disordered. This notion is captured in the evaluativism-objectivism conceptual dimension of 
classification as described by Peter Zachar and Kenneth Kendler in their article “Psychiatric Disorders: 
A Conceptual Taxonomy.” The objectivism–evaluativism dimension asks the question, “is deciding 
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whether something is a disorder a simple factual matter, or a value-laden judgment (Kendler and 
Zachar, 558)?” Evaluativism is a rejection of the idea that those things which are considered mental 
illness are determined through purely objective means. Kendler holds that objectivism depends on the 
idea of “natural function;” that is, if something breaks, we can fix it without judgment about how it 
ought to function. But evaluativists dismiss objectivism, saying that what counts as dysfunction 
inevitably entails this judgment. Bioethicist Norman Daniels offers a response to this tension with his 
concept of “normal species functioning.” Daniels says that diseases are deviation from the natural 
functional organization of a typical member of the species, and that we have an objective interest in 
identifying disease consistently in order to maintain a normal range of opportunity for all members of 
the species (Silvers, 64). At their ideal, our disease classification schemes are formed using judgment 
that has an interest in maintaining equal opportunity for all.  
 Another aspect of the normativity of nosology is its conjectural status –  that our existing 
classification schemes are our best attempt at mapping disorder, but may not represent “nature carved 
at its joints.” This aspect of nosology is developed in the nominalism-essentialism dimension laid out 
by Kendler and Zachar. This dimension asks the question, do we believe that we can uncover a 
classification scheme in which categories are determined by their “underlying nature,” or do we define 
our categories practically, for the purposes of human use (Zachar and Kendler, 558)? The phrase 
“carving nature at its joints,” coined by the early Greeks, has been frequently used to reflect the 
phenomenon of essentialism. Essentialists believe that nature can be carved at its joints to reveal 
classifications distinguished by their causal and biological ubiquity, and that it is the task of nosologists 
to identify and classify them accurately; successful essentialism in the natural sciences, such as 
chemistry, has led to the identification of elements such as gold or oxygen as “natural kinds” (Zachar 
and Kendler, 558). Nominalists, however, maintain that there is ambiguity about whether our nosology 
can reflect deeper truths about the world or “carve nature at its joints.” Whether or not disorders exist 
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as “natural kinds” in the world, we must recognize that there is no best way for classifying them, and 
that, therefore, nosologists must use some judgment as to which factors should be highlighted and 
minimized when designing nosology (Zachar and Kendler, 558). The scientific community's awareness 
that nosology may not correspond to universals is critical for an awareness of its normativity.  
 The normativity inherent to nosology as well as its problematic aspects can be further 
articulated by noting the difference between statistical norms and norms as prescriptive ideals, as 
standards. Ideally, nosology would capture statistically abnormal states in order to, as Daniels suggests, 
restore opportunity to their species (Silvers, 64). But many norms are prescriptive because they 
reinforce an ideal as a norm. One useful example of the different functions of norms is the norm of two 
legs – a condition which is statistically normative among humans, but becomes prescriptive when we 
structure our physical space to be navigated in ways that give preference to it. If nosology reflects 
prescriptive ideals not backed by statistical norms, it suggests the problematic aspects of normativity.  
 The scientific community acknowledges that our values play a role in shaping classification 
schemes, and despite our best efforts at objectively deciding what constitutes disease or isolating 
“natural kinds,” nosology may be influenced by existing social norms or power structures (Foucault, 
xi). They also note that values shape what gets prioritized and discovered in scientific research 
(Cooper, “Classifying...,” 4). Critical interaction with nosology requires awareness that our 
classifications are conjectural and reflect our norms and values.  
 
II. The evolution of the concept of mental illness, the psychiatric institution, and psychiatric nosology  
 An examination of the history of any science will demonstrate that normativity is inherent to the 
development of its classification scheme. History also shows the role of prescriptive ideals in shaping  
the problematic normative aspects of nosology. Michel Foucault's history of Western societies' 
construction of the paradigm of madness in the 15th century shows the distance between the 
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establishment of the concept of mental illness and its formulation into concise scientific nosology 
today.  
  Foucault's account of history is laden with an awareness of the role of social power in creating 
and establishing norms. In his book, Madness and Civilization, Foucault writes that that the need to rid 
society of undesirables, and the need for cheap labor, motivated an increase in people considered mad 
by society; these first “mad” people had nothing to do with science. After epidemics of leprosy receded 
in the 15th century, “madmen” who had previously been driven beyond city walls were confined in 
leper hospitals, where they became subjects of the state (Foucault, 42). Later, thought that the source of 
their disorder was sin and idleness, these mad people confined in hospitals were made to do cheap labor 
as “penance and redemption” (Foucault, 54). Madness became increasingly criminalized, mad people 
were objects of animalistic exhibition, and an objective conception of the constitution of madness 
began to develop (Foucault, 69). At the turn of the eighteenth century, medical facilities for the 
mentally ill took on the role of curing society's mad (Foucault, 85). A theory of psychology dominated 
by Freudian psychoanalysis emerged. The incorporation of mental illness into a burgeoning, 
increasingly organized health care system in the United States led to the first attempt at a 
comprehensive nosology in 1952. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders – I and II 
(1968) were uncontroversially based in psychoanalysis' theory of inner conflict (Kawa & Giordano, 3).  
 This account shows the problematic aspects of normativity in early attempts to classify the mad. 
Psychiatric nosology has its history in prescriptive ideals and designs for social control, and though the 
nosology has developed in an direction which is increasingly conscious of its normative status, 
problematic normative aspects are still at play.  
 The DSM-III (1980) represented a “revolutionary,” paradigmatic shift in psychiatric 
classification and the scientific status of psychiatry. In response to anti-psychiatrists who claimed that 
mental illness is socially constructed, the DSM-III represented psychiatry's aspiration to an increasingly 
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objective nosology by way of scientific scrupulosity (Kawa & Giordano, 5). From psychoanalytic 
Freudian states of “neurosis” to discrete disease categories including “neurotic disorder,” the DSM-III 
was seen as a “victory of science over ideology” and was the impetus for new research concerning drug 
treatment for and epidemiological investigations of DSM-III disorders (Kawa & Giordano, 5).  
 The medicalizing trend of the DSM-III is evidenced in the subsequent DSM-III-R, DSM-IV, 
DSM-IV-TR and DSM-V (slated for release in summer 20130). These versions include increased data 
on prevalence, expanded sub-types for disorders, and “culture-bound syndromes” – an 
acknowledgement of the cultural variations in presentation and prevalence of disorders (Kawa & 
Giordano, 6). DSM-V is expected to cite increased biological, genetic and neurological findings, and 
specify how this information can be employed in diagnosis and treatment (Kawa & Giordano, 6).  
 The DSM and the nosological community have made great strides against the problematic 
aspects of normative judgments simply by becoming self-aware. The perspective to reflect on nosology 
as a mechanism for social control, by pathologizing socially undesirable behaviors or medicating social 
ills, has dismissed the nosology's most overtly evaluativist claims. And increased research efforts to 
develop classifications based on biological regularities are a powerful contribution to the ideal of an 
objective nosology. Still, psychiatric nosology remains powerfully normative. The patient narratives 
examined later in this paper suggest that true believers' and skeptics' interactions with diagnosis may 
have been influenced by varying awareness of the history of psychiatry, and of its normative status.  
 
III. DSM culture's monopoly and the master narrative  
 Today, the DSM has a monopoly on defining mental disorders, and is the dominant (and often 
sole) lens through which it is interacted with and understood. Two philosophers examined later in this 
paper, Ian Hacking and Serife Tekin, cite the DSM's multi-focal monopoly over the mental health 
system as explanation for the DSM's dominant culture and how its nosology is represented without 
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implication of its normative status (Tekin, Self-Insight, IV; Hacking, “Making Up People,” 2).  
 Today, the DSM serves as the centralized, universal manual for all parties concerned with 
mental disorders. It is the gospel for diagnosis and further psychiatric research; it also a tool for the 
legal, insurance and pharmaceutical purposes. Some worry that pressure from pharmaceutical lobbyists 
to raise the “prominence” of a condition so that their drugs will be more widely used hinders an 
accurate nosology (Tsou, “The Importance of History...,” 448). Others note how pressure to appeal to 
funders and government endorsement might skew a research agenda (Kawa & Giordano, 6). Further, if 
doctors diagnose with the motivation of getting reimbursement for patients based on the severity of the 
coded diagnosis, will this shift the stringency of “what counts” in the DSM (Tsou, “The Importance of 
History...,” 450)?  
 And the comprehensive DSM culture has generated problems for how mental illnesses are 
understood in society. Psychiatry has seen an increase in psycho-pharmaceutical interventions, while 
efficacious drugs for some disorders do not exist, and there is potential for abuse in this realm (Kawa & 
Giordano, 8). Further, there are concerns about disease mongering and the interpretation of subjective 
variables as diagnosable disorders. According to Kawa & Giordano, half of Americans will meet the 
qualifications for some disease in the DSM in their lifetime. Does the DSM pathologize behaviors such 
as shyness, medicalize social ills and deviance, or make authoritative claims about what constitutes 
normal in society (Kawa & Giordano, 9)? These issues all raise questions about how a psychiatric 
patient might respond to diagnosis with this awareness.  
 Yet a more essential concern about the financial and pharmaceutical pressures on the DSM is 
whether these demands distract from the scientific agenda of identifying essential “natural kinds,” the 
underlying natural organization of categories independent from human involvement (Tsou, “The 
Importance of History...,” 2; Kendler & Zachar, 558). Some worry that the DSM cannot meet all the 
extra-scientific demands leveled at it; others have concern that the DSM “distorts the status of current 
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knowledge about mental disorders” by disseminating presumed (expert-refined and institutionally-
taught) knowledge as “fact” (Tekin, Self-Insight, IV; Hacking, “Making Up People,” 2). Again, the 
status of their relationship to these concerns may shape the experience of diagnosis for psychiatry 
patients.  
 These issues are linked to the difficulties of formulating nosology: existing classifications 
legitimize named diseases, while construing the constructed-ness of the categories themselves. This 
constructed-ness is further construed by the framing of the medical narrative as the “master narrative,”  
claims Jennifer Radden in her article “Recognition rights, mental health consumers and reconstructive 
cultural semantics.” Radden suggests that the master narrative is an expression of the power of a 
dominant group; in the case of psychiatric diagnosis, “telling it medically is taken as telling it 'how it 
is.'” The medical narrative is purported as objective, and the nosology it references a depiction of 
“nature carved at its joints.” It is so powerful that it denies alternative narratives their “vitality and even 
intelligibility” (Radden). But for all its ubiquity, the history of psychiatry will remind us that the 
medical framing of mental disorder was itself once a counter-story. Psychiatric nosology's normativity 
is construed by a dominant DSM culture and a medical master narrative which deny how values and 
power have shaped its origins.  
 Awareness of the normativity of nosology and its role as master narrative is critical to our 
interaction with it. We should presume that the scientific community interacts with the taxonomies it 
develops with heavy nominalist sensibilities, but among laypeople, the notion that a scientific 
classification scheme is not or does not believe itself to be essentialist may be the cause of 
misconception about the 'realness' and experience of the diagnosis, and its implications. The 
misimpression that diagnoses represent disorders which are bonafide “natural kinds” or pieces of 
“nature carved at its joints,” especially in dominant forms such as the master narrative purported by 
authoritative experts and institutions, may cause its conjectural and normative nature to be overlooked. 
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Varying levels of awareness of normativity are demonstrated in patients' written narratives, and seem to 
play a role in the patients' interaction with their classification.  This awareness may differently shape 
the expectations for, experience of, and reaction to diagnosis for each patient, and should be seriously 
considered in the way experts represent and convey scientific knowledge.  
 
IV. Hacking and Tsou on looping effects 
 Given that psychiatric nosology and the DSM culture in which it is delivered are normative, two 
interesting questions are, how do patients interact with their classification or diagnosis? And, how do 
they do so in light of this normativity? I intend to examine patients' firsthand, written narratives to see 
what interaction looks like, and whether any cognizance of normativity that I refer to can be detected to 
analyze its effects on patient interaction with diagnosis. Do patients reflect on their diagnosis with 
awareness that the ideal objectivity of psychiatric classifications is inherently normative, or suggest 
belief in the universalizability of their diagnosis, that it is a component of “nature carved at its joints?” 
 Ian Hacking's looping effects theory, later refined by Jonathan Tsou, is the most, relevant 
prominent response to the question of how the diagnosed interact with the diagnosis. In the following 
pages, I will lay out Hacking's theory, and Tsou's response to it, before examining whether it has 
explanatory power for the diagnostic experience reflected in the patient narratives, or accounts for an 
awareness of normativity. Tsou's response better accounts for the patient experience evidenced in the 
narratives, but neither Hacking nor Tsou consider the effect of patients' beliefs about the normative 
status of nosology in their theory of interaction.  
To develop his theory of looping effects, Hacking challenges the common idea that people are 
solid objects of human science inquiry which can be grouped into definite classes by definite properties 
(Hacking, “Making Up People,” 1). He thinks that nosology is dynamic – in his words, the “names 
interact with the named” (Hacking, “Making...” 1). Hacking suggests a new way to conceive of objects 
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of classification that considers whether the classified are shaped by awareness of the classification. He 
calls the components “indifferent kinds” and “interactive kinds” (Hacking, “Madness...,” 101).   
Interactive kinds are those for which awareness of classification affects the experience of it. 
These classifications, “when known by people or those around them, and put to work in institutions, 
change the ways in which individuals experience themselves—and may even lead people to evolve 
their feelings and behavior in part because they are so classified” (Hacking, “Madness...,” 104). What 
was known about interactive kinds may become false because the people of that group have changed in 
virtue of how they have been classified, what they believe about themselves, or because of how they 
have been treated as so classified (Hacking, “Madness...,” 104). This change is a looping effect.  
One way to imagine the looping effect is using Hacking's example of Multiple Personality 
Disorder. In 1970, some psychiatrists began to diagnose MPD; people increasingly came forward, 
presenting the symptoms for the disorder (Hacking, “Making Up People,” 2).  Quickly, the mean 
number of personalities rose from two to seventeen. Psychiatrists used this feedback to update the 
diagnosis, and therapists anticipated a high number of personalities (Hacking, “Making Up People,” 2). 
Moreover, a Freudian theory of early sexual abuse was put forward to explain the disorder, and patients 
obligingly produced the memories (Hacking, “Making Up People,” 2). Hacking argues that, before the 
diagnosis, for example in 1955, MPD wasn’t an identity for a person or which one’s family, friends, 
counselors and world could interact with; but in 1985, after the diagnosis was well-established, MPD 
was “a way to be a person, to experience oneself, to live in society” (Hacking, “Making Up People,” 3).   
This feedback between the diagnosis and the diagnosed is what Hacking identifies as the 
looping effect. An increased manifestation of symptoms led to a revision of the standard diagnosis and  
explanation, and patients presented symptoms according to the new framework put forth by experts. 
But Hacking thinks that the cycle of looping persists beyond a single revision of the diagnosis; “our 
interactions [continue to] change them” and the target moves (Hacking, “Making Up People,” 2).  
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Hacking distinguishes indifferent from interactive kinds because awareness does not change or 
make a difference to them; they are not subject to looping effects. Indifferent kinds are characterized by 
an assumed fixed underlying biological, neurological or genetic ubiquity. This biological “indifference” 
is an assumed aspect of “natural kinds;” natural kinds are thought to be the elementally isolated objects 
such as gold, oxygen, lemon and horses (Hacking, “Madness...,” 107).  
Hacking asserts that the classifications employed in the human sciences are mostly interactive 
kinds, subject to looping effects. About classified people, Hacking writes, “they are moving targets 
because our investigations interact with them, and change them. And since they are changed, they are 
not the same kind of people as they were before. The target has moved. I call this the ‘looping effect.’” 
(Hacking, “Making Up People,” 1). Hacking's claims have big implications for how we should expect 
psychiatric patients to relate to their diagnoses.  
Jonathan Tsou responses to Hacking set the stage for this paper's investigation of whether 
Hacking's theory can explain the phenomenon in psychiatric patients' narratives of  diagnosis. Tsou's 
analysis supports his critical claim that objects of psychiatric classification – and objects of human 
science classification in general – are less subject to strong looping effects, and that they may be more 
stable than the moving targets that Hacking imagines them to be. Tsou's response is a more accurate 
representation of the interaction demonstrated in the patient narratives examined in this paper. Still, 
neither Tsou nor Hacking seem to account for the effect of patients' awareness of normativity on the 
interaction with their diagnosis.  
In his response, Tsou first questions whether Hacking's “kinds” refer to classifications or 
objects. He points to Hacking's fuzziness in defining indifferent kinds: he refers to them as 
“classifications without looping effects” in contrast to interactive kinds, but also as referencing a 
“stereotypical biological abnormality” (Tsou, “Hacking...,” 332) (Hacking, “Madness...,” 104). The 
first reference suggests that interactive kinds are mutually exclusive to indifferent kinds, based on the 
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presence of a looping effect (Tsou, “Hacking...,” 334). But Hacking also suggests that some human 
kinds are both interactive and indifferent kinds (Tsou, “Hacking...,” 334) (Hacking, “Madness...,” 115). 
Tsou holds that Hacking cannot then claim that looping effects are the sole criteria for distinguishing 
between kinds (Tsou, “Hacking...,” 334).  
This inconsistency is helpful for Tsou to posit that “kinds” refer to classified objects. He holds 
that, though Hacking claims to be talking about kinds as classifications, his suggestion that they depend 
on the presence of a “biological pathway” implies that they more adequately refer to objects of 
classification (as the classifications cannot have biological pathways) (Tsou, “Hacking...,” 335).  
The more significant contribution of Tsou to Hacking's argument and to the argument that will 
be developed in this paper is a refreshed distinction between indifferent and interactive kinds of objects 
of classification. He holds that objects of human science classification can – and do – have both 
indifferent and interactive aspects! Tsou thinks indifferent kinds are characterized by “a clear and 
predictable biological basis” for mental disorder, regardless of looping effects (Tsou, “Hacking...,” 
336). Like Hacking, Tsou takes the “biological regularities” evidenced in current research for 
schizophrenia and depression “to count...for the reality of these conditions, and indicate the way in 
which such conditions approach the traditional idea of 'natural kinds'” (Tsou, “Hacking...,” 337). What 
distinguishes indifferent kinds is the law-like presence of these regularities, and not that the 
classifications of these conditions will be void of looping effects.  
It is objects' awareness of the classification that characterize Tsou's interactive kinds (Tsou, 
“Hacking...,” 337). Tsou points out that one would expect all objects of human science classification to 
have this characteristic, to varying degrees, based on how directly aware they are of their classification 
(Tsou, “Hacking...,” 338). Autistic children, for example, are likely to be less aware of their 
classification than would anxious adults.  
Tsou uses this new distinction to dismantle Hacking's idea that because of the persistently 
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dynamic relationship between human science classifications and objects, the kinds of people being 
classified are “on the move,” with the implication that there is “no stable object to study” (Tsou, 
“Hacking...,” 338). Tsou smartly contends that objects of human science classification are interactive 
and indifferent kinds, and that their indifferent aspects can be understood as exerting a stabilizing force 
which makes them not subject to looping effects; moreover, he thinks that Hacking's claim that 
classifications with indifferent aspects are rendered unstable by their looping effects is a failure to 
distinguish between the implications of strong and weak looping effects. Tsou's account of looping 
effects better explains the phenomenon in the patient narratives.  
 
IV. Do narratives reflect the theory?  
 Tsou's responses held that Hacking does not provide enough evidence to substantiate his claim 
that, because of looping effects, objects of human science classification are “on the move” – or 
“moving targets” (Hacking, “Madness...,” 109). Hacking's claim, Tsou maintains, results from a 
conflation of weak and strong looping effects, and a lack of acknowledgement of the stabilizing effect 
that the indifferent aspects of interactive/indifferent kinds have on objects of classification. Because 
most interactive kinds also have indifferent aspects, Tsou submits, they are much more stable than 
Hacking suggests.  
 A reasonable expectation for any theory is that it would explain the phenomenon. I want to 
understand the patient's (the object of classification's) perspective on interaction, and decided to look 
into written patient narratives of the experience of diagnosis (classification) to see if and how looping 
effects, as presented by Hacking and refined by Tsou, were evidenced. Below, I demonstrate how 
patient narratives confirm Tsou's claims: that Hacking mistakenly conflates strong and weak looping 
effects; and that most objects of classification are less moving targets subject to less strong looping 
effects than Hacking thinks, because their indifferent aspects (biological regularities) have stabilizing 
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force. Moreover, the patient narratives demonstrate that there is reason to think that patients' beliefs 
about the normativity of psychiatric classification and the DSM affect the way they experience and 
interact with their diagnosis. This is an aspect of looping effects – which has implications for the 
stability of moving targets – not accounted for by Hacking or Tsou.  
 I limited my search for patients' reflections on diagnosis (which I might use to detect evidence 
of looping effects and stability, and awareness of the classifications' normativity) to short narratives 
available to the public on the internet. I found that most of the first-hand writing available was either 
self-published in forum-style locations (where mental illness was the topic) or was presented as 
testimonial on a mental health advocacy website that somehow reflected the values of that 
organization. The forums featuring personal stories ranged from the New York Times Patient Voices 
blog, which interviews patients about their experience of disorders by classification, to the Experience 
Project, a place for “true stories shared by real people,” to Half of Us, an MTV-sponsored project 
which aims to raise awareness of the prevalence of mental illness among young people. The 
organizations included the National Alliance on Mental Illness, the national support network for mental 
illness care, Rethink, a organization devoted to challenging mental illness stigma, and MindFreedom 
International, a psychiatric survivors movement. The vast majority of the narratives I encountered 
could be easily separated into two distinct groups based on whether the patients' writing about their 
experience of diagnosis suggested they were amenable to the DSM master narrative. For my analysis, I 
decided to select one narrative representing each of the groups which epitomizes the characteristics 
unique to that group. Previewed for the reader in the introduction of this paper, Woodrow Odom Lucas' 
narrative represents the “true believer” phenomenon, while Leah Harris represents the “skeptics.”   
 It is important to note that all of the narratives found on the internet and examined to test for the 
explanatory power of the theory are not a perfect cross section of stories of the experience of mental 
disorder diagnosis. These written, publicly available narratives are self-selecting by their authors' 
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literacy and access to the internet; more importantly, these narratives are self-selecting based on their 
authors' desire to discuss their experience. In any type of survey that requires the participants' initiative, 
there is an overrepresentation of those participants who feel strongly that their experience was 
particularly good or bad. In the case of diagnosis or the broader experience of mental illness, patients 
who have a strong opinion about the experience are more likely to have composed and published a 
narrative about it than those who consider their experience typical or average. Still, the narratives 
available suggest that sizable contingents of “true believers” and “skeptics” exist among psychiatric 
patients, and that any theory of looping effects should account for these experiences.  
 
V. Narrative finding: true believers stabilize 
 Woodrow Odom Lucas' narrative reflects the experience of the true believer. The “true 
believers” suggested that they fully identified with the DSM framework. The true believers' narratives 
were laden with language that implied that patients accepted its explanation for their disorder. These 
patients did not demonstrate any awareness of or reflection upon the normative aspects of psychiatric 
classification – that it may be value-laden or socially constructed, or may not be an objective reflection 
of “nature carved at its joints.” These patients' writing suggested that they assent to the DSM master 
narrative.  
 Lucas, a 36 year old male diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, writes about his experience 
on the New York Times “Patient Voices” blog as follows (“Patient Voices: Schizophrenia”):  
 “The first time I began having symptoms of schizoaffective disorder was in 1999. 
I started to hear strange voices, not just comforting or guiding internal intuitions, but 
voices telling me that I was the spawn of Satan, or voices telling me that I was about to 
come under judgment...I really began to believe those voices. I experienced acute 
psychosis, which I thought at the time was a demon inside of my trying to take over my 
mind. Schizoaffective disorder is like a cross between bipolar and schizophrenia. The 
psychosis side and the delusion side is much less severe than schizophrenia but more 
severe than bipolar II. The mood swings in my opinion may be a little less severe than 
certain dimensions of bipolar so it's like worse than bipolar, better than schizophrenia, 
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and a mixture of the two. 
 In the beginning, it was horrific. I had a lot of ambition...all of this was shattered. 
My efficacy as a father was virtually gone. I felt like I had no love for my wife or anyone 
in the beginning months. I was extremely depressed, morose and disconnected. I think 
I've got a long way to go, but throughout it, because of the love of God and people, it's 
been a journey of hope.” 
 
 The first characteristic of true believer narratives is that their authors claim their diagnosis. In 
the first lines, Lucas writes, “I began having symptoms of schizoaffective disorder.” As opposed to 
saying, “I was diagnosed with” or “the doctors said I had” schizoaffective disorder, he claims it. Lucas 
also explains his behavior using the diagnosis – he describes the experience of a demon trying to take 
over his mind as “acute psychosis.” His assent to the language of his diagnosis to identify his 
experiences is further evidence for his acceptance of it. Lucas also identifies with his diagnosis, so 
much so that he seems able to be familiar with what psychiatrists might consider a “classic 
presentation” of it, and place his individual experience in the spectrum he understands between the 
classifications of bipolar and schizophrenia. This understanding seems to suggest that Lucas generally 
“buys into” or trusts psychiatric nosology. 
 In her paper “Self-Insight in the Time of Mood Disorders: After the Diagnosis, Beyond the 
Treatment,” Serife Tekin (another critic of Hacking's) points to peoples' “tendency to identify personal 
features with vague characterizations” that are prevalent in things like astrological readings, as 
cognitive bias. Lucas seems to demonstrate cognitive bias in his writing with his seemingly complete 
resonance with the explanation offered by his diagnosis. Tekin thinks that cognitive biases and their 
interaction with the dominance of the DSM master narrative may inhibit patients' ability to think about 
classification well by provoking patients to over-identify with symptoms at the risk of discounting 
other factors (Tekin, “Self-Insight...,” 14). Tekin cites a patient's memoir of psychopathology where she 
notes that the testimony has traces of a DSM-led framework, and suggests that the patient accepted 
what she saw as a plausible explanation of her instability in DSM reasoning without considering or 
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“responding resourcefully” to vividly contingent interpersonal problems (Tekin, “Self-Insight...,” 26). 
Lucas' interpretation of his experience has traces of the DSM framework – in particular, his assertion 
that his symptoms can be characterized as “worse than bipolar, better than schizophrenia, and a mixture 
of the two” seems to attribute legitimacy and authority to the DSM explanation. Though his narrative 
does not provide enough evidence to draw a conclusion about this, Tekin gives us reason to wonder 
whether Lucas' assent to the DSM framework inhibits his ability to consider other factors in his life that 
may be affecting his mental health.  
 Lucas' narrative, like all true believers', suggests that true believers may attribute objectivity to 
their diagnosis without reflecting an awareness of its normative status. In their perhaps over-
identification with generalized diagnostic language, true believers seem to either be ignorant of or 
apathetic toward the normative aspects of diagnosis and nosology more generally.  
 How do true believers' narratives support Tsou's response to Hacking? The evidence in Lucas' 
writing appeals to Tsou's submission that looping effects are typically weaker than Hacking claims, and 
undermines Hacking's idea that they make moving targets. Contra to Hacking's claim that the 
classifications and their objects are subject to a perpetual cycle of looping effects, the experience of 
diagnosis actually seems to have a very rapid stabilizing effect upon true believers who embrace and 
assent to the explanation of their diagnosis. Hacking does not provide an explanation for these 
stabilized objects of classification in his theory.  
 Hacking says that any object of human science classification is an interactive kind (Hacking, 
“Madness...,” 103). Tsou refines Hacking's claim to state that most objects of human science 
classification are actually interactive and indifferent kinds, with aspects of each: the looping effects 
which characterize interactive kinds, and the biological regularities of indifferent kinds. This 
adjustment to Hacking's theory, which claims that most objects of classification share underlying, law-
like biological similarities with other objects of the same classification, provides early support for the 
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thesis that objects of psychiatric classification are less destabilized than Hacking predicts. Some shared 
biological aspect must limit or regulate the extent to which objects of classification can loop. Most 
objects of classification should be more stable than Hacking thinks.  
 True believers' narratives demonstrate that these objects of classification interact with their 
classifications in a certain way. Woodrow Odom Lucas and other true believers are most centrally 
characterized by their assent to the master narrative – their diagnosis informs and frames the experience 
of the mental disorder. The assent to master narrative causes extensive looping in one direction: the true 
believer “changes the way they experience themselves because they are so classified” to align more 
perfectly with the classification (Hacking, “Madness...,” 104).  
 True believers loop intensely to mirror their classification but don't demonstrate looping effects 
in the way Hacking expects them to: unceasingly (Hacking, “Making Up People...,” 3). True believers 
interact with their classification and are changed by looping effects only in order to correct any distance 
from the decree of their classification. Their buy-in to the DSM master narrative reflects an implicit 
conviction that the classification is stable; they may be ignorant of the normative status of nosology, or 
unconcerned by it. The true believer is stabilized by their belief in the stability of the classification and 
human science nosology in general. Tekin also observes this phenomenon in her notes on cognitive bias 
(Tekin, “Self-Insight...,” 14).  
 The true believers' narratives demonstrate a phenomenon that Hacking does not account for in 
his theory of looping effects, and which challenges his idea that objects and classifications are 
indefinitely destabilized in the human sciences. Jonathan Tsou's point that most objects of human 
science classification have both indifferent and interactive aspects suggests that objects' indifference 
will exert some initial stabilizing force. But beyond the presence of biological indifferences, it seems 
that the object of classification's orientation to the normativity of diagnosis demonstrated through 
whether they assent to the master narrative is telling for a theory of looping effects. True believers – 
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objects of classification that assent to the master narrative – will loop once with diagnosis, their 
narratives show, and are then stabilized.  
 The one direction looping effect of the true believers' interaction with diagnosis is an example 
of the weak looping effects which Tsou thinks Hacking fails to distinguish from the strong in his 
account. Tsou also claims that objects of classification are more stable than Hacking suggests. Hacking 
does not offer an interpretation of objects that have stabilized; Woodrow Odom Lucas and other true 
believers' narratives give us more reason to think, as Tsou does, that the experience of classification 
may make some objects of classification less subject to looping effects and less moving targets than 
Hacking thinks.  
 
VI. Narrative finding: skeptics fall outside the looping effect 
 The patient narratives revealed another group of objects of classification whose diagnostic 
experience can be used to test for the integrity of looping effects theory. The narratives produced by 
these “skeptics” depict their rejection of the DSM explanation for their experience, and suggest a total 
renunciation of the master narrative framework. The experience of this group of psychiatric patients has 
largely gone unnoticed, ignored or disregarded in the scientific community's accounts of interaction 
with mental illness because these subjects tend to reject psychiatry as a whole, and disassociate 
themselves from it. Still, this experience should be considered in theories of interaction; to not include 
it is to deny the possibility of a complete account of the experience of diagnosis.  
 Most of the authors of the skeptic narratives claimed some association with the anti-psychiatry 
movement, which aims to take action for human rights violations in the mental health system (MFI 
Portal). A number identified as “psychiatric survivors” (MFI Portal). The narratives of these skeptics 
revealed their resistance to diagnosis as the exclusive explanation for their experience. Many assumed 
the “skeptical” position after a bad experience as a diagnosed person. A number expressed that their 
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resistance began when they found that their psychiatric caregivers were not concerned with features of 
their life external to the symptoms dictated by the diagnosis. Others recalled an experience which had 
provoked them to notice some aspect of normativity and become skeptical about the integrity of 
psychiatric nosology as a whole, citing it as a tool for social construction or control. As opposed to true 
believers, the central characteristic of the skeptics is that they display hyperawareness of the 
problematic normative aspects of psychiatric nosology. They find the classification so flawed that they 
reject the diagnosis altogether and remove themselves from DSM culture. In contrast to the true 
believers Serife Tekin cites in her discussion of cognitive bias and the master narrative, these skeptics 
develop a way to “respond resourcefully” to the challenges they face without interacting with DSM 
culture (Tekin, “Self-Insight...,” 26). This response makes skeptics outliers to DSM culture and the 
master narrative; they do not interact with it.   
 Skeptics' suspicion of the integrity of psychiatric classification may be connected to their 
personal experience of poor care or abuse as a patient in the mental health system. In some cases, this 
negative experience may have instigated their resistance to DSM culture, and awareness of the 
normativity of nosology may have followed. This path does not illegitimize the skepticism of patients' 
narratives for their “subjectivity;” all experiences of diagnosis are, as we have established, laden with 
subjectivity and value.  
 Their written narratives demonstrated the skeptics' hyperawareness of the normativity of 
psychiatric nosology. The skeptic phenomenon is epitomized in the narrative of Leah Harris, a former 
teenage mental health patient, whose writing was found on the “Beyond Meds – Alternatives to 
Psychiatry” blog (“Decolonizing our minds, freeing our spirits: Guest blogger Leah Harris”): 
 “I had just been released from yet another hospital for a half-hearted suicide 
attempt... I had alternately fought and reluctantly accepted a view of myself as “sick” and 
“disordered.” I hated the labels but identified with them at the same time...I had no tools, 
no frameworks, with which to redraw the maps in my mind... But slowly, I discovered 
that I could work with voices...I have gotten feedback from many people that when they 
Jager 23 
 
got a psychiatric label, it was a relief because it gave a name to what they had been 
experiencing. I don’t discount the importance of a framework to make sense of our 
experiences, but who wants to be defined by a so-called illness? 
 I have found great validation...not from any psychiatric label but from friends in 
and out of the “mad movement.” We see how various institutions and oppressions are 
connected...It matters not if we are “well” or “ill,” “normal,” or “disordered.” I see our 
movement as... stealing back truths from industries that would have us only consume 
what they produce, whether it’s ways of viewing ourselves or specific “treatments.” They 
would have us believe that we are so “sick” that we don’t know what’s in our own best 
interest, and we resist that determination with all our might. We are teaching each other 
how to get free.” 
 
 One of the primary characteristics of the skeptics is that they refer to diagnosis as a 
“psychiatric label,” as Leah Harris does in her writing. This reference seems to imply the authors' 
awareness that nosology may be constructed for human use and may not reflect deeper truths 
about the world. Her use of quotations marks for the words “sick,” “disordered,” “well,” and 
“ill” further implies her awareness of this construction, and the way that normative judgment is 
conveyed through these terms. Harris also seems to believe that her mental experience might be 
considered something other that an “illness” in another paradigm, when she calls it a “so-called 
illness.” 
 Harris also seems to be aware of the factors that influence the way diagnosis is proliferated, as 
are most skeptics. She denounces the “institutions,” “oppressions,” “and industries” she sees as 
influencing her diagnosis and putting a monopoly on the way she should experience and deal with her 
mental states. Harris' awareness of the factors at play in her diagnosis seems to energize her quest to 
reject its definition of her. Her connection to the mad movement gives her resources to “respond 
resourcefully,” as Tekin writes, to her diagnosis without legitimating the psychiatric label or institution 
(Tekin, “Self-Insight...,” 26). Like all skeptics, Harris' narrative demonstrated how some classified 
objects' hyperawareness of the normative status of diagnosis, and psychiatry more generally, cause 
them to distance themselves from it, reject the claims it makes about their experience, and find 
alternative ways to address their mental health if and as they see fit.  
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 In their responses to Hacking, both Tsou and Tekin seem to have missed another contingent of 
patients' diagnostic interactions – the skeptics! The skeptics are so aware of normativity of nosology 
that they deny it entirely. Their rejection of diagnosis and their refusal to assent to the medical master 
narrative mean that they do not interact with their classifications. They are made outliers to DSM 
culture and, moreover, move so far from their classification that they're no longer subject to looping 
effects. Skeptics' skepticism stabilizes them outside the looping effect. This skepticism and stabilization 
is depicted in Leah Harris' narrative. Hacking's theory does not account for outliers whose skepticism 
causes them to stand outside his phenomenon. Neither do Tsou or Tekin. Moreover, these skeptics' 
resistance to the looping effect gives us reason to think that patients' beliefs about normativity affect the 
way they interact with their diagnoses! More empirical research is needed to support this claim but, if 
founded, it has crucial implications for how information about how psychiatric and other human 
sciences classifications are proliferated by the DSM culture. Moreover, it would implore psychiatry to 
better account for skeptics' experience.  
 To Hacking, any object of human science classification is an interactive kind, characterized by 
how their awareness of their classification may "change the ways in which individuals experience 
themselves—and may even lead people to evolve their feelings and behavior in part because they are so 
classified” (Hacking, “Madness...,” 104). Tsou holds that all objects of human science classification 
have interactive but also indifferent aspects – some shared biological regularities which ground and 
limit the interaction between the object and its classification (Tsou, "Hacking...," 331). Hacking thinks 
that what was known about interactive kinds may become false because the people of that group may 
change “in virtue of how they have been classified, what they believe about themselves, or because of 
how they have been treated as so classified” (Hacking, “Madness...,” 104). This looping makes the 
objects perpetual moving targets, destabilized by their awareness of their classification.  
 Leah Harris and other skeptics' narratives revealed that the experience of this cohort of patients 
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is no doubt shaped by their status as interactive kinds and their awareness of being classified; in fact, 
their interaction is most characterized by hyperawareness of their classification. And this 
hyperawareness of their classification as a classification or "psychiatric label" – a claim about their 
own experience which is laden with normativity – causes the objects to move away from their 
classification as a rejection of it. This is the interaction particular to skeptical objects of classification: 
awareness of their classification causes them to react to it in such a way that they distance themselves 
from the master narrative and from DSM culture altogether.  
 The iteration of interaction characteristic to skeptical objects of classification actually has 
immense stabilizing force for its objects. Their awareness of the classification causes them to move so 
far outside the looping effect that they are no longer subject to it. They are stabilized because their 
conviction about the normative status of the entire classification scheme is what maintains their refusal 
to interact with it at all. By making claims that suggest they see through the master narrative, and 
denying the legitimacy of the nosology as a whole, they place themselves outside the looping effect. 
The skeptics' static belief about the normativity of the classification scheme actually stabilizes "what 
they believe about themselves" (Hacking, “Madness...,” 104).  
 Skeptics are outliers to looping effects theory in the direction opposite true believers: as 
opposed to true believers' conviction about the stability of their classification and nosology in general 
which stabilizes them against further looping effects, skeptics' suspicion of their diagnosis and rejection 
of nosology stabilizes them outside DSM culture. Hacking's theory does not account for these objects 
of classification whose awareness of their classification causes them to reject its legitimacy and refuse 
to interact with it. The narratives of skeptics give us reason to think that the looping effects theory 
explicated by Hacking, Tsou and Tekin is not a comprehensive account of all of the ways objects of 
classification can interact with their diagnosis. Moreover, the narratives of the true believers and the 
skeptics suggest that patients' beliefs about the normativity of psychiatric classification may be relevant 
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to the way they interact with diagnosis.  
 
VII. Beliefs about normativity influence interaction  
 Patient narratives reveal the strong stabilizing power of diagnosis for two types of patient 
responses to diagnosis which Hacking neglects to account for -- the "true believers" who fully identify 
with the DSM's "master narrative" framework; and the "skeptics," often identified with the anti-
psychiatry movement, who reject the DSM explanation and mainstream psychiatric culture. The 
existence of these groups, as evidenced through their narratives, demonstrates another flaw of 
Hacking's looping effect theory -- that it does not consider these outliers.  
 I hold that their beliefs about the normative status of nosology are what distinguish true 
believers and skeptics from one another, and that it is the rigidity of their beliefs in either direction that 
explains how they become stable objects amidst Hacking's moving targets. More broadly, I submit that 
patients' beliefs about the normative status of scientific classification schemes, and psychiatric 
nosology specifically, influence the way patients interact with diagnosis. An awareness of the history of 
psychiatry and/or its normative function in society may be relevant to the formation of these beliefs.  
 The writing of the skeptics shows that belief that the nosology is fallibly normative is relevant 
in their rejection of its claims about their experience and in undermining the authority of psychiatry 
more generally. The skeptics' beliefs about normativity are typically characterized by their own 
negative or deceptive experiences within the mental health system, their hyperawareness of the extra-
scientific agendas and pressures on the DSM, and perception of the master narrative as propagandist to 
some extent. Though references to its deeply normative, unscientific history are rarely overt in patient 
narratives, true believers seem to recognize the historically normative function of psychiatry, and reject 
it because of this legacy. It is easy to see how familiarity with the history of the concept of mental 
illness and nosology described earlier in this paper might develop patient skepticism. It is also easy to 
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imagine that acquaintance with other skeptics or anti-psychiatrists before or in the course of diagnosis 
might influence skepticism towards one's diagnosis. The mad movement Leah Harris describes 
association with seems to provide support and solidarity for resistance to the what she sees as the 
master narrative (“Decolonizing our minds, freeing our spirits: Guest blogger Leah Harris”). The 
skeptical community seems key to skeptics' rejection of diagnosis and nosology and seeking of 
alternative responses. The skeptics' written narratives made it clear that their interaction with diagnosis 
were framed by these beliefs and experiences.  
 True believers' beliefs about the normative status of nosology are not overtly available in their 
writing. However, from the absence of normativity claims or references in the narratives, we can make 
inferences about these beliefs. True believers either don't recognize the normative status of nosology, or 
don't see it as a problem. If true believers do not think that nosology is normative, we can infer that 
perceptions about the non-normative status of nosology may influence their interactions with their 
diagnosis. Or, if they acknowledge normativity but don't it as a problem, we can infer that their 
disregard for the normative status of nosology may influence the way they respond to their diagnosis.  
 Further empirical research is needed to support the claim that patients' awareness of the 
normativity of nosology affects the way they interact with their classification. Quantitative research is 
needed to develop a better understanding of what proportion of psychiatric patients experience 
diagnosis as skeptics or true believers. And research more directly examining patients' beliefs about and 
awareness of normativity and its problematic aspects is needed to determined whether the relationship 
between beliefs about normativity and interaction with diagnosis is truly causal. Specifically, research 
should attempt to get more information about the state of true believers' beliefs and awareness of 
normativity, and better identify those variables most influential in skepticism. All of this research 
would make valuable contributions to scholarship on beliefs, science and psychiatry, and could be 
useful to psychiatrists seeking to better and more accurately present information on nosology and 
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diagnosis to lay people.  
  
VII. Conclusion 
 An account of the history, normative status and social function of psychiatric diagnosis is 
critical to understanding how patients interact with it. This paper analyzed first-person patient 
narratives of psychiatric diagnosis to determine whether the narratives reflect Ian Hacking's looping 
effects account of patient interaction. The narratives supported Jonathan Tsou's claim that psychiatric 
patients are more stable, less “moving targets” than Hacking thinks. While Hacking and Tsou highlight 
the ways patients interact with diagnosis and cite the biologically indifferent aspects which ground 
interaction, they neglect to account for a crucial factor in patients' interaction with diagnosis: their 
beliefs about the normative and scientific status of diagnosis and the psychiatric institution more 
generally. The writing of “skeptics” and “true believers” shows that patients' beliefs about the 
normative status of psychiatric nosology affect their response to and interaction with diagnosis. We can 
imagine that these beliefs are formed in light of patients' perceptions of the history and social role of 
diagnosis.  
 The claim that patients' beliefs about normativity affect their interaction with diagnosis 
provokes many interesting future investigations. How do we develop a nosology increasingly void of 
problematic normative aspects? How do we mediate between the competing interests of the psychiatric 
institutions and the goals for psychiatric nosology? How should scientists communicate the normativity 
inherent to science accurately and accessibly? What factors influence the extreme positions of the true 
believer and the skeptic? Do features of their diagnosis predispose them to respond with assent or 
paranoia? How does patients' access to a community of patients influence the way they interact with 
diagnosis? How do we construct an theory of interaction that includes skeptics, who become outliers to 
nosology and the psychiatric institution? In addition to philosophical work, empirical research is 
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needed to clarify the relationship between beliefs about normativity and reaction to diagnosis. This 
research is crucial for developing a more accurate account of patients' interactions with diagnosis, and 
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